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Ideas of Michael Smith, by Text
[Australian, b.1954, At Oxford, Princeton, Monash Universities; then Professor at Australian National University.]
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1.10
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p.44
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23728
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Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept
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1.3
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p.8
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23724
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A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief
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1.3
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p.8
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23723
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In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
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2.4
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p.24
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23727
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Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
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3.1
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p.61
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23729
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Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating
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3.1
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p.62
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23730
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'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it
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3.1
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p.63
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23731
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'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives
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3.3
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p.67
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23732
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A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it
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4.2
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p.96
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23733
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Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external
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4.5
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p.107
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23735
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Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions
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4.5
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p.109
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23736
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A person can have a desire without feeling it
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4.7
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p.119
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23738
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Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate
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4.8
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p.125
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23739
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Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us
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5.1
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p.130
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23740
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Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions
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5.4
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p.136
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23741
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Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring?
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5.7
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p.145
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23742
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If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win
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5.9
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p.163
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23743
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Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible
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5.9
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p.163
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23744
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Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough
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5.9
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p.165
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23745
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We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action
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5.9
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p.175
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23746
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Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
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